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2 Valence Potential
Abstract
Optimal-level theories maintain that the quality of affect is a function of a
quantitative arousal potential dimension. An alternative view is that the
quantitative dimension merely modulates pre-existing qualitative properties and
is therefore only responsible for changes in the degree of affect. Thus, the
quality of affect, whether it is positive or negative, has to be treated as a
separate independent variable. In an experiment to compare these alternatives,
the quantitative dimension was manipulated by varying the degree of
unexpectedness of endings in stories that were overall either positive or
negative. Contrary to predictions of optimal-level theory, results showed that
differently valenced story endings, judged the same on an expectation scale,
were rated very differently in hedonic tone and preference.
Quantitative and Qualitative Sources of Affect: How
Unexpectedness and Valence Relate to Pleasantness and Preference
In 1874, Wundt proposed the classic inverted-U curve to link stimulus
intensity and hedonic states. According to Wundt, stimulus intensity up to a
moderate level is increasingly pleasant and beyond this optimal-level stimuli
become increasingly less pleasant up to some indifference baseline, from which
point unpleasantness increases with increments in stimulus intensity. As a
major theoretical construct, the optimal-level curve stimulated a great deal of
research, especially during the 1950's when the hypothesis underwent an
important revision (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; Haber, 1958).
According to the revised version, affect is "a function, not of increasing
physical intensity per se, but of the size of the discrepancy between the
adaptation level (adaptation or expectation) of the organism, and the stimulus
(perception)" (Haber, 1958, pp. 370). Subsequent major developments in
optimal-level theory were primarily due to Berlyne (e.g., 1960, 1973, 19 74 a) who
reintroduced the original Wundt curve, replacing intensity with arousal
potential, i.e., arousal-inducing properties of external stimulation. Berlyne
defined arousal potential to include not only intensity or discrepancy from
expectation but other "collative" variables such as complexity, incongruity,
conflict, and uncertainty.
The basic assumption underlying the optimal-level hypothesis is that the
origin of the quality of affect, be it positive or negative, lies in the
quantitative dimension (the quantity of arousal potential, the size of the
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discrepancy from expectation, etc.). A clear statement of the quantitative
origin of the quality of affect may be seen in the following quotation from
Haber (1958):
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell (1953) have developed a theory
based, in part, on Hebb's (1949) neurological model of the origin of
affect and Helson's (1947) notion of adaptation level. According to
McClelland's discrepancy hypothesis as to the origins of affect,
'positive affect is the result of smaller discrepancies of a sensory or
perceptual event from the adaptation level of the organism; negative
affect is the result of larger discrepancies' (McClelland, et al., 1953,
p. 43). (Haber, 1958, p. 370, italics added)
More recent statements of optimal level theory do not explicitly claim that the
quantitative dimension is the sole source of the quality of affect, but they do
suggest that it causes affective quality. For instance, Berlyne (1974b) stated
that "positive hedonic values can come about in either of two ways, namely
through a moderate increase in arousal (the 'arousal-boost mechanism') or
through a decrease in arousal when arousal has reached an uncomfortably high
level (the 'arousal-reduction mechanism')" (p. 8). Furthermore, even in the
more recent optimal-level literature, researchers treat the quantitative
dimension as if it were the only source of affective quality (i.e., valence of
hedonic tone); certainly, they never explore any other sources.
While it is reasonable to assume that the quantitative dimension modulates
intensity (cf., Gati & Tversky, 1982), the proposal that it determines quality
is more troublesome. It can be argued that quality is fundamentally distinct
from quantity (e.g., Gati & Tversky, 1982; Iran-Nejad, 1980; Iran-Nejad &
Ortony, 1982; Stevens, 1957). In the context of affect, the
qualitative/quantitative distinction is central, most notably, to the two-factor
theory of emotion proposed by Schachter and Singer (1962).
In examining the qualitative/quantitative view of the origin of affect,
this paper attempts to deal with the problem of testability often raised in
connection with the optimal-level theory. The problem arises from the
difficulty of determining a priori where on the abscissa of the inverted-U curve
the optimal level (or point) is located. Arkes and Garske (1977), for instance,
state the problem as follows: "If an optimal level of a subject is known, and
the complexities of the various stimuli presented to the subject span a range
above and below the optimum, then an inverted-U must be found in order to
support the theory. However, most optimal-level research does not specify an
individual's optimal level a priori" (p. 164). Consequently, empirical results
showing linear rather than curvilinear properties can always be explained away
as representing sampling of the independent variable on only one side of the
optimal-level. Thus, Arkes and Garske have concluded that "an inverted-U
relation allows so many possible curves that the theory is difficult to refute."
In view of the amount of research that the inverted-U hypothesis has generated
and continues to generate (e.g., Carrol, Zuckerman, & Vogel, 1982; Eysenck,
1967; Greenberg & O'Donnell, 1972; Karmel & Maisel, 1975; Zillmann, 1980), the
conclusion that the theory may be irrefutable and therefore "worthless" (Arkes &
Garske, p. 164) is a disturbing one. However, we believe that it would be wrong
to draw such a conclusion. One clear prediction that optimal-level theory makes
is that a given degree of arousal potential cannot give rise to both positive
and negative affect. This may be contrasted with the hypothesis of independence
of quality from quantity, and the corollary hypothesis that it is the
qualitative variable that is the direct source (cause) of affect. On this view,
under different qualitative conditions, a given degree of arousal potential can
be positive or negative. In contrast to the notion of arousal potential, which
signifies, in part, the quantitative dimension, we refer to the qualitative
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variable as valence potential: The potential that a stimulus has for influencing
valence-specific biofunctional characteristics of the organism.
Two lines of research may be construed as having already produced results
contradicting the purely quantitative inverted-U hypothesis. One line of
research generally cited as counter-evidence (see Walker, 1981) has involved the
use of gustatory stimuli (e.g., Engle, 1928; Pfaffman, 1960, 1969). Certain
stimuli (e.g., quinine) fail to result in pleasantness at any concentration
(Pfaffman, 1960, 1969) and others (e.g., sugar) seem either to be pleasant
regardless of their intensity (Engle, 1928), or become unpleasant only after
post-ingestion factors intervene (see, e.g., Pfaffman, 1960). Walker (1981),
however, has argued that optimal-level theory can survive such findings. He
reasoned that gustatory/sensory data might deviate from the inverted-U curve
because they merely reflect peripheral activity and concluded that curves such
as those resulting from Engle's data might "be brought together to form an
inverted-U if they were plotted against neural intensity . . . measured at an
appropriate central site rather than in the sensory nerve" (p. 42-43).
The other line of research, though not commonly discussed in connection
with the inverted-U hypothesis, originated in the work of Schachter and Singer
(1962). Their theory of emotion suggests a separation of the kind of affect
from the quantity of arousal. However, neither the original Schachter and
Singer (1962) experiment, nor studies adopting a similar attribution of arousal
approach (e.g., White, Fishbein, & Rutstein, 1981) have unequivocally
demonstrated that the same degree of arousal can be both positive or negative--a
demonstration that we believe to be necessary if the inverted-U hypothesis is to
be definitively refuted. The typical attribution of arousal paradigm involves
"(a) the experimental manipulation of a state of physiological arousal, (b) the
manipulation of the extent to which the subject has an appropriate or proper
explanation of his bodily state, and (c) the creation of situations from which
explanatory cognitions may be derived" (Schachter & Singer, 1962, p. 382). An
optimal-level theorist can argue that the latter two manipulations, rather than
exerting their influence on the quality of affect in terms of cognitive labeling
operations, do so in terms of their own arousal-inducing properties. For
example, in the Schachter and Singer experiment, apart from the intended direct
manipulation of arousal through injection, other aspects of the experiment may
have produced additional arousal. Epinephrine-ignorant subjects, lacking a
proper explanation for their arousal symptoms, may have been additionally
aroused as a result of subjective uncertainty. Epinepherine-misinformed
subjects may have been aroused not only because of subjective uncertainty or
injection but also because of the discrepancy between the symptoms they were
expecting and those they actually experienced. Furthermore, the affect-inducing
situation itself may have given rise to additional arousal, perhaps more so for
the anger than the euphoria condition as the Schachter and Singer data seem to
indicate.
Similar problems arise in interpreting other experiments in this tradition.
For instance, White, Fishbein, & Rutstein (1981) had male subjects participate
in an exercise (the arousal manipulation) either for 15 seconds (Low Arousal,
LA) or for 120 seconds (High Arousal, HA). The subjects then watched a
videotape of a female confederate who was made to appear either highly
attractive (High Attraction, HAT) or unattractive (Low Attraction, LAT).
Subjective measures of attraction indicated that HA-HAT subjects liked the
confederate more than LA-HAT subjects, and HA-LAT subjects liked her less than
LA-LAT subjects. The scores for LA-HAT, HA-HAT, LA-LAT, and HA-LAT conditions
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would constitute an inverted-U curve if they were arranged in that order. An
inverted-U interpretation of the data would only require the assumption that the
negative attraction condition caused more arousal than the positive attraction
condition.
It is perhaps because of such considerations that optimal-level theory has
continued to exert an influence on research in spite of evidence that appears to
be inconsistent with it. The inverted-U hypothesis is employed in such diverse
domains as infant perceptual development (e.g., Greenberg & O'Donnell, 1972;
Karmel & Maisel, 1975), aesthetics (e.g., Berlyne, 1971, 19
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a), environmental
psychology (e.g., Mehrabian & Russell, 1974), media entertainment (e.g.,
Zillmann, 1980), and prose comprehension and appreciation (e.g., Brewer &
Lichtenstein, 1981; Kintsch, 1980; Moynihan & Mehrabian, 1981).
Although the valence potential hypothesis and the attribution of arousal
theory both maintain that the quality of affect is distinct from the level of
arousal, they are markedly different in other respects. Our approach, which is
based on a biofunctional model of cognition (Iran-Nejad & Ortony, 1982), has,
for present purposes, three important characteristics. First, it claims that
the intensity factor exerts its influence on already-existing quality, rather
than quality somehow emerging from cognitive evaluations that label or explain
already-existing arousal. With respect to the empirical framework, this
assumption means that the initial valence potential of the stimulus must be
taken into account. For instance, if Schachter and Singer had had an
independent group of subjects rate the behavior of the confederate on a
dichotomous negative/positive scale, they would presumably have observed that
the situational cues in the anger condition were initially negative and that
those in the euphoria condition were initially positive, quite independently of
attribution of arousal operations. A second characteristic of our view is that
cognition does not generate affective quality-valence is independent of
meaning, and valence potential properties of the stimulus are independent of
their meaning potential. This implies that cognition influences the quality and
intensity of affect not directly but in terms of valence potential properties of
the stimulus which, presumably, exert their influence through certain affect-
specific areas of the brain. This notion assumes that the experience of affect
can, in principle, occur in the absence of cognitive content, as has been
proposed by Zajonc (1980), in the same way that (cold) cognition can occur in
the absence of affect. Empirically, this means that the quality of affect has
to be considered as a separate categorical variable, distinct not only from
physiological arousal or other quantitative factors, but also from cognitive
evaluation. Finally, the biofunctional theory implies that the intensity of
affect factor must be distinguished from the intensity of arousal dimension.
This contention is supported by evidence that cognition can directly intensify
the experience of affect without the mediation of autonomic arousal (Iran-Nejad,
1983).
The quantitative factor manipulated in the present experiment is the level
of unexpectedness. It must be noted, however, that there exists no evidence
that unexpectedness (or any other collative variable) exerts its quantitative
influence in terms of autonomic arousal even though many optimal-level theorists
assume that it does. Rather, we, like they, examined the (quantitative)
influence of unexpectedness per se on the experience of affect. Since most
optimal-level studies do not involve direct measures of autonomic arousal, the
use of unexpectedness as a quantitative variable is entirely fair.
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Our qualitative variable, the valence potential of the stimulus, must be
distinguished from hedonic tone. Hedonic tone refers to the experience of
degrees of pleasantness or unpleasantness, while valence potential refers to
stimulus properties that influence the sign of that experience. Hedonic tone,
therefore, is a combination of both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of
affective functioning. It is a continuous variable resulting from the
interaction between two independent dimensions, or causes. Obviously, when
valence potential is realized as affective experience, it always and only
manifests itself in some quantity, that is, in terms of degrees of affective
experience. In this sense, quality of affect and its intensity are independent
in much the same way that, by analogy, the essential nature of a substance
(e.g., sugar) is independent of (i.e., cannot arise from) the weight dimension.
Increasing the amount of such a substance from one arbitrary quantity to another
results only in more of the same. It does not and cannot change the substance
to a different substance (e.g., sugar to salt).
The use of valence potential as an independent variable raises the problem
of whether it should be treated as a dichotomous or trichotomous variable.
Although the phenomenological experience of affect can be positive, negative, or
neutral, one cannot assume that valence potential has the same tripartite
structure. In fact, we propose that valence potential has no neutral level.
Since this is a crucial assumption, the following extended analogy will be used
to clarify it: Imagine an object able to move forwards or backwards along a
straight line. The object can be in one of three states. It can be moving
forwards, it can be moving backwards, or it can be stationary. Velocity, which
is a continuous variable, is a function of direction and speed. Speed is the
quantitative dimension, and direction is the qualitative dimension. Non-zero
velocities arise from the contribution of non-zero speeds to one of the two
levels of direction. The special case of zero velocity arises not from the
contribution of speed to some third level of direction (i.e., "no direction"),
but simply from zero speed. Thus, it makes no sense to talk of degrees of
"stationariness." Notice, however, that extremely low speeds may result in a
moving object seeming to be stationary (one cannot see the hour hand moving on a
clock face). But, this is a fundamentally different sense of the word
"stationary" from the genuine absence of velocity (and direction).
So too with affect: An organism can be in one of three experiential
states. It can be in a positive, negative, or neutral state. Hedonic tone,
which is a continuous variable, is a function of valence potential and a
quantitative factor. Non-zero levels of hedonic tone arise from the
contribution of non-zero levels of the quantitative dimension to one of two
levels of valence potential. The special case of zero hedonic tone arises not
from the contribution of the quantitative dimension to some third level of
valence potential (i.e., no valence), but simply from a zero level on the
quantitative dimension. Thus, while positive and negative hedonic tone can vary
in degree, it makes no sense to talk of degrees of neutrality. Notice, however,
that extremely low levels on the quantitative dimension may result in a valenced
stimulus seeming to be neutral. But, this is a fundamentally different sense of
the word "neutrality" from the genuine absence of hedonic tone (and valence
potential).
If valence potential is indeed only a two-valued variable, it follows that
attempts to determine the valence of some particular stimulus (i.e., the
qualitative component of the resulting hedonic tone) must avoid mistaking
apparent neutrality (i.e., imperceptibly low levels of hedonic tone) for genuine
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neutrality (i.e., the absence of valence potential). Things that are minutely
positive or negative are, nevertheless, positive or negative.
So far we have been using the term affect as if it were synonymous with
hedonic tone. Optimal-level theorists rarely distinguish between hedonic tone
and, for example, preference: "the term 'hedonic tone' embraces . . . degree of
pleasure, preference, or utility" (Berlyne, 1974b). However, there is no a
priori reason to equate hedonic tone and preference. Indeed, there is some
evidence suggesting that they are distinct psychological dimensions (see,
Moynihan & Mehrabian, 1981). It seems entirely possible that a person could
judge two objects as being equally pleasant while still preferring one over the
other, perhaps because of additional (cognitive) qualitative factors (e.g.,
interestingness).
The present experiment attempted to test the predictions of optimal level
theory and contrast them with those of the valence potential hypothesis. This
was done by manipulating the level of unexpectedness and the valence potential
of the critical conclusion information in story endings. Subjects read stories
and then made hedonic tone and preference ratings. Optimal-level theory would
seem to make the following predictions: (a) the quality of hedonic tone (i.e.,
positive or negative) should be a direct result of the unexpectedness of the
critical conclusion information in story endings, and thus identical degrees of
unexpectedness should result in hedonic states of the same quality (pleasant or
unpleasant), and (b) identical levels of unexpectedness should result in
identical degrees of preference. In addition, (c) unexpectedness should make no
significant contribution to preference beyond its contribution via hedonic tone
(because hedonic tone and preference are not distinguished). In contrast, the
predictions of the valence potential hypothesis are: (a) the quality of hedonic
tone should be independent of the expectation manipulation (because initial
valence potential is the only source of affective quality), and thus identical
levels of unexpectedness can result in either pleasant or unpleasant hedonic
states depending on the initial valence potential of the critical conclusion
information; and (b) identical levels of unexpectedness can result in different
degrees of preference, again depending on the valence potential of the critical
conclusion information. Furthermore, since hedonic tone and preference are
assumed to be psychologically distinct, (c) there could be a contribution of
unexpectedness to preference after its effects through hedonic tone have been
partialed out.
Method
Subjects
Sixty high school students (grades 11 and 12) participated in the main
experiment. The majority of the subjects were female but the two sexes were
approximately evenly divided among the experimental conditions.
Design and Materials
Design. A 2 x 2 randomized factorial design was used with two levels of
expectation (expected vs unexpected) and two level of valence potential
(positive vs negative). Both factors were between-subjects.
The passages. The four passages were revised versions of a story by
Thurmond (1978). Each version consisted of a stem and an ending. Altogether,
there were four stems and two endings. The basic story was about a nurse,
Marilyn, who left the hospital where she worked after a late night shift. As
she was driving home, she noticed that she was running out of gas. This
frightened her, especially because there had been a recent surge in muggings and
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beatings in the area. She decided to go to a gas station run by a person called
Gabriel, with whom she was slightly acquainted having been to his station for
gas before. He fills up the car and tells her that he has recently received an
unusually nice birthday gift. He insists that she go inside his office to see
it. She finds herself in an awkward situation and reluctantly accepts the
invitation. The stem ends as she follows him inside.
Unexpectedness was manipulated by withholding information from the stems
(of the unexpected versions) or by signaling it in the stems (for the expected
versions) in otherwise identical story versions. Note that, as it is, the basic
stem implies that Marilyn is perhaps going to be raped/mugged and that Gabriel
is perhaps a rapist/mugger. The column labeled "Critical Ending Information" in
Table 1 shows the gist of the conclusion information for negative and positive
Insert Table 1 About Here
story versions. In the ending for negative valence potential conditions, it
turns out that Marilyn is not raped/mugged and that Gabriel is not a wolf in
sheep's clothing. Rather, the police discover heroin in Marilyn's car and
arrest her. Thus, the critical conclusion information for this ending is that
Marilyn is a drug dealer, and that Gabriel is an informer instrumental in her
arrest. Overall, this information was assumed to have negative valence
potential. In the ending for the positive valence potential conditions, again
Marilyn is not raped/mugged. Furthermore, Gabriel, who apparently suspected
that "someone" was hiding in the back of Marilyn's car calls the police. They
come, but find no rapist/mugger in the car. Instead they find the dog of the
hospital parking lot attendant. Thus, the critical conclusion information for
this ending is that a (friendly) dog emerges from Marilyn's car, that she is
safe, and that Gabriel is a Good Samaritan. This information was assumed to
have overall positive valence potential.
The column marked "Critical Stem Information" shows the main thematic
additions to the basic stem, as well as other important stem information, for
each of the four conditions. The expected and unexpected story versions were
constructed so as to be semantically similar as much as possible, especially
with respect to the overall story content at the moment the subjects finish
reading the story and begin their affective ratings. The main difference
between the stem for the unexpected negative version and the basic stem was that
the former contained a sentence indicating that while driving home Marilyn
noticed a police car behind her. It also contained information suggesting that
there might be something suspicious about Gabriel: "Marilyn discounted the few
disturbing rumors that accompanied his sudden appearance in the area." This
stem, therefore, implied that Gabriel was a wolf in sheep's clothing and
possibily a rapist/mugger and that Marilyn was perhaps going to be raped/mugged.
The stem for the expected negative story contained additional information
indicating that Marilyn was somehow involved with drugs, although the nature of
this involvement (e.g., as a pusher, in connection with her job as a nurse, or
even as an FBI undercover agent) was not clear. For example, the stem stated
that while driving "she looked forward to a long soak in the tub . . . [and]
while she soaked she planned to skim through a new magazine and forget about her
involvement in the drug business." Thus, like the unexpected negative one, this
stem implied that Gabriel might be a rapist/mugger and that Marilyn was in
danger of being raped/mugged. However, this stem also implied that Marilyn was
probably a drug dealer. and that Gabriel was perhaps a police informer.
13 Valence Potential
16 Valence Potential
The unexpected positive version was constructed by adding information to
the basic stem implying that someone might be hiding in Marilyn's car--"she
thought she heard someone breathing behind her." Information was also inserted
suggesting that Gabriel probably saw someone hiding in the car and invited her
inside in an attempt to get her out of danger. Therfore, in this stem, while
Marilyn was again likely to be raped/mugged, Gabriel was not portrayed as a
rapist/mugger. Rather, the stem implied that he was perhaps a Good Samartan
intending to save Marilyn from getting raped/mugged by a maniac probably hiding
in the back of her car.
The expected positive stem contained information additional to that in the
unexpected positive stem--information compatible with the possibility that the
dog of the hospital parking lot attendant was in the back of her car. In a
brief dialog the attendant tells Marilyn that his dog is lost, that when it gets
bored "he goes and sleeps in the back of my car," and that "he isn't there now."
However, again, even though this version was designated as "expected," the
possibility that there was a person in the back of Marilyn's car always
remained. This ending implied that Marilyn was again in danger of getting
raped/mugged, if not by someone hiding in the car but by a rapist/mugger running
loose in the area. Gabriel was perhaps again going to be a Good Samaritan.
As, described earlier, two endings were associated with these four stems,
one for the negative pair and one for the positive pair. The ending for the
negative conditions begins with Gabriel turning quickly around and locking the
door. He pulls a gun and tells Marilyn that there is no birthday present. At
this point, approaching squad cars are heard and the gas station is soon filled
with flashing lights. Police officers search Marilyn's car, and find three bags
of heroin. They come in, handcuff her and take her away. As she sits in the
police car, she regrets having trusted Gabriel.
In the ending for the positive conditions, Gabriel locks the door, gets a
gun, and calls the police. They arrive and Marilyn and Gabriel go to the window
to watch. It is clear now that both are safe. Then, when the police open the
car door, "a large dog stepped out, obviously confused by the flashing lights
and sirens" and Marilyn realizes that it belongs to the security guard of the
hospital parking lot.
Story characteristics. The two story endings were constructed a priori
such that the critical conclusion information for the negative story versions
has negative valence potential and that for the positive story versions is
positive. It must be noted, however, that it is not a forgone conclusion that
the endings are as they were intended to be in terms of valence potential. For
instance, there are at least two reasons why the negative ending might in fact
be rated as positive. First, in this ending, a guilty drug dealer, Marilyn,
gets her just deserts (i.e., gets arrested). Secondly, contrary to what was
implied by the negative stems, Marilyn is not raped/mugged. One might think
that what happened to Marilyn (i.e., the arrest) was not quite as bad as what
was expected to happen (i.e., rape/mugging). In order to confirm that the
valence potential of the critical conclusion information of the negative
versions was negative, and of the positive versions was positive, the materials
were normed. Since affective judgments were to be made after reading the entire
story, steps were taken to avoid a potential confounding in norming the
stories. While reading a story, a reader may experience a sequence of
alternating affective states. For the purposes of the present experiment, the
critical state is the last one, the one that follows the expectation
manipulation and determines affective judgments of the subjects. We felt that
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the valence of this state could be assumed to be determined only by the valence
potential of the critical conclusion information, and the intensity of this
state could be assumed to be determined by the degree of unexpectedness of the
critical conclusion information. In order to take account of this
consideration, the norming task had to distinguish between the valence potential
of the mental state that was assumed to be the basis of the (final) affective
judgements and that of all other (prior) mental states subjects might have
experienced. In other words, although the valence potential of the critical
conclusion information had to be determined in the context of the rest of the
story, if subjects read a story and are then asked whether it is positive or
negative, their response might be based not just on the last affective state
that they experienced, but on some summary judgment of the sequence of the
earlier states. To reduce the chance of this potential contamination, two
synopses were constructed, one for the positive and one for the negative
versions. These synopses were constructed so as to match as closely as possible
the representations of the semantic content of the stories that subjects would
presumably have immediately after reading them. The following is the synopsis
for the positive versions:
Marilyn, a nurse, leaves the hospital where she works after a late night
shift. A dog belonging to the hospital parking lot attendant is
sleeping in the back seat of her car. She knows the dog but she does
not know that it is in the car. As she is driving, she notices that she
is low on gas. She decides to go to a gas station whose attendant she
knows. While cleaning the back windows, the attendant sees something.
He thinks someone is probably hiding in the back of her car and gets her
out by inviting her to go inside his office "to see the nice birthday
gift my sister gave me." Once inside, he calls the police. When the
police come, they find the dog. Marilyn notices that it is the dog of
the hospital parking lot attendant.
Eight adult judges rated the conclusion of this synopsis (i.e., the way it
ended); seven of them rated it as positive on a dichotomous (positive vs
negative) scale. Eight different judges rated the conclusion of the synopsis
for the negative versions and all of them rated it as negative.
The dependent measures. Each subject in the main experiment read the stem
and then stopped briefly to respond to two preending rating scales. Each scale
ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). One of the scales,
the preending preference scale, asked subjects to indicate their degree of
agreement with the statement: "I would like to see this story end in an
unexpected way, that is, in a way very different from the way the story makes me
think it will end." The second scale asked the subject to rate the degree to
which "I would like to stop here and not read the ending." On the next page,
subjects were actually given the choice of reading the ending or recalling the
story. Subjects not choosing this option, and none did, turned the page and
read the ending. They were then immediately asked to rate the ending on a
pleasantness scale ranging from 1 (extremely unpleasant) to 10 (extremely
pleasant), and on an expectation scale ranging from 1 (extremely unexpected) to
10 (extremely expected).
In addition, there were five postending preference scales. The first scale
measured the degree of agreement of the subject with the statement, "I would
like to read again a story with an ending of the same type (meaning expected or
unexpected) as the one I just read." We will refer to this as the direct
postending preference scale, because it asked subjects to rate their preference
for the type of ending they had just directly experienced. The remaining
preference scales were indirect in that they asked subjects to rate their
preferences for types of story endings they had not actually encountered. There
were four such scales. The first (Scale 1) measured the degree to which the
subject "would like to read a passage with an unexpected ending if the ending is
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pleasant." Scales 2, 3, and 4 repeated the same statement, replacing the words
unexpected/pleasant with expected/pleasant, expected/unpleasant, and
unexpected/unpleasant respectively.
Procedure
Each subject received a booklet containing the instructions, the passage,
and the rating scales. The instructions told the subject that the experiment
was concerned with memory for what people like to read as opposed to memory for
what they do not like to read. They were told that they would read two
passages, that they would be asked to recall only the second passage, and that
the purpose of the first passage was to determine the type of passage people
like to read. Subjects then read the stem, responded to the preending rating
scales, read the ending, and responded to the postending rating scales. The
response booklets were then collected and subjects received a second booklet
containing memory instructions and a short passage. The memory protocols for
this passage were later discarded since their only function was to complete the
"cover story."
Results
Preending Ratings
Responses to the two preending questions were quite uniform. Most subjects
indicated that they would like to see the story end in an unexpected way
regardless of the condition they were in (overall mean = 7.18, SD = 2.44). This
finding is, incidentally, inconsistent with the claim that unexpectedness per se
is aversive (see, e.g., Aronson, 1968). Similarly, subjects strongly disagreed
that they wanted to stop before reading the ending (overall mean = 1.34), and
none of them chose to do so.
Postending Ratings
Unexpectedness ratings. The mean expectation ratings are presented in the
first column of Table 2. Evidently, the expectation manipulation was
successful. A two-way analysis of variance on expectation scores showed a
Insert Table 2 About Here
significant effect for level of expectation; F(1, 56) = 21.52, 2 < .01. The
main effect for valence approached significance, F(1, 56) = 3.72, p = .06;
negative versions tended to be rated as less expected than positive versions.
There was no significant interaction between valence and expectation, (F < 1).
Dunn's multiple comparison tests resulted in significant differences between the
two positive (expected vs unexpected) and the two negative conditions, p < .01
and ( < .05 respectively. The mean expectation ratings for the two unexpected
endings were not significantly different, the difference in ratings being a mere
0.73, suggesting that subjects regarded the unexpected endings as being equally
unexpected. This finding is particularly important in the present context
because the critical hypotheses to be tested concerning the relation between
affect and expectation require that the level of expectation be the same for the
two unexpected endings. The two expected conditions were not significantly
different either, although the magnitude of the difference was somewhat larger
(1.74).
Pleasantness ratings. The mean pleasantness ratings are also shown in
Table 2. The two expected endings were both rated as neutral (means: 4.93 and
5.13 for the positive and negative versions, respectively), supporting the
contention that at lower levels of the quantitative dimension (unexpectedness),
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valenced objects can appear to be neutral. The ratings for the two unexpected
endings (which represent high levels of the quantitative dimension) were
significantly different (means: 7.60 and 3.53 for the positive and the negative
versions, respectively). Thus, contrary to the predictions of the inverted-U
hypothesis, hedonic tone (i.e., pleasantness) increased with increments in
unexpectedness for positive stories, but decreased for negative ones. A two-way
analysis of variance on pleasantness ratings resulted in a valence x expectation
interaction F(1, 56) = 23.89, $ < .01. This interaction is illustrated in
Figure 1. Consistent with the valence potential hypothesis, the same degree of
Insert Figure 1 About Here
unexpectedness resulted in pleasantness or unpleasantness depending on the
valence potential. As anticipated, there was also a significant main effect for
valence; F(1, 56) = 19.62, p < .01. There was no significant main effect for
expectation; F(1, 56) = 1.49; p = n.s. Multiple comparison tests pairing the
two positive (expected versus unexpected), the two negative, and the two
unexpected versions all reached significance at .01, .05, and .01 levels,
respectively.
Preference Ratings. In order to examine the hypothesis that the same
degree of unexpectedness would result in different degrees of preference,
depending on the valence potential, a 2 x 2 analysis of variance was carried out
on the direct postending preference scores. The main effect for valence, and
the valence x expectation interaction barely missed significance, F(1, 56) =
3.77 for both, p = .06. However, the crucial difference, namely that between
the means for the two unexpected endings, was significant using Dunn's
procedure, p < .05. Figure 2 shows that, as predicted, the same degree of
Insert Figure 2 About Here
unexpectedness resulted in different degrees of preference. For the positive
story, high unexpectedness resulted in high preference, but for the negative
story it resulted in relatively low preference, supporting the view that
unexpectedness influences preference through valence potential. Comparison of
preending with postending preference data for the two unexpected endings also
produced results consistent with this interpretation. As illustrated in
Figure 3, subjects in the positive unexpected condition expressed a strong
preference (mean = 8.13) for an unexpected ending prior to actually reading such
Insert Figure 3 About Here
an ending and their level of preference for such an ending remained high
(mean = 8.07) after reading one. However, subjects in the negative unexpected
condition, while also expressing a high preference (mean = 7.20) for an
unexpected ending prior to reading one, showed a significant drop in preference
ratings for such an ending after actually reading one (mean = 5.33).
Another hypothesis was that unexpectedness influences preference
independently of its effects through hedonic tone. This hypothesis received
some support from the fact that the partial correlation between unexpectedness
and preference scores, controlling for pleasantness scores (i.e., hedonic tone),
was significant, r = .30, p < .05.
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Direct Versus Indirect Preference Scales
It is always possible that subjects in this experiment experienced no
affect at all, but responded to the rating scales on the basis of abstract,
"cold" judgments. For example, their ratings might merely have been based on
some sort of affect-free "inference rules" such as "unexpected things are
usually interesting, and therefore, preferable." The indirect postending
preference scales were included to address this issue. The direct postending
scale asked subjects about their preference for a passage with an ending of the
same type as the one they had just experienced, at a time when, presumably, the
affective state they were in was a result of reading the story. Thus, this
scale attempted to measure the influence of direct (concrete, raw) affect on
subjects' preference. On the other hand, the four indirect scales required
subjects to rate their preference for different types of story endings in
abstracto. So these scales were more likely to reflect abstract, affect-free
judgments. Therefore, higher preference ratings on the direct than on the
indirect postending scales might serve to increase one's confidence that the
direct scales were indeed measuring experienced affect. It should be noted that
this depends on the conservative assumption that ratings on the indirect scales
were not influenced by affective reactions to the passage.
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Table 3 shows the mean ratings for these scales. While there were 4
indirect scales, one corresponding to each condition, only one of them was
comparable to the direct preference scale that a subject encountered in his or
her condition. For instance, in the unexpected positive condition, the direct
preference scale measured subjects preference for a passage with an unexpected
pleasant ending. Therefore, for this condition, ratings on the direct scale
(mean: 8.07) are comparable only to those on the indirect Scale 1 (mean:
6.67), that is, to the scale that asked subjects to rate their preference for a
passage with an unexpected pleasant ending. The corresponding pairs of means
(direct versus indirect) are underlined in Table 3. The overall mean for the
direct preference scale (6.32) was significantly higher than the overall mean of
the four comparable (i.e., underlined) indirect scales (5.02), t(59) = 2.58, p <
.05. The overall mean for the direct preference scale is also comparable to a
combination of the overall means of the four indirect scales (i.e., the mean of
the values in the "total" row of Table 3). This contrast (6.32 vs 5.05) was
also significant at .05 level. For both tests, the magnitude of direct
preference scores was larger than that of indirect scores, suggesting that
affective ratings were more pronounced when they were not based on what may have
been relatively abstract ("cold") judgments.
Discussion
The critical finding with respect to the inverted-U hypothesis is that the
two unexpected endings, while not rated as significantly different in terms of
unexpectedness, produced hedonic tone ratings that were not qualitatively
identical, as predicted by the optimal-level theory, but that were diametrically
opposed to one another. Thus, it appears that unexpectedness of the critical
conclusion information intensified affect in terms of the valence potential of
this information. Rather than directly causing quality, quantity manifested
itself in terms of quality.
As far as the preference results are concerned, subjects in the two
expected conditions did not differ in their preference ratings. However, again,
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those reading the unexpected endings diverged in their preference ratings.
Unexpected pleasant endings were rated as preferable to unexpected unpleasant
endings. Thus, unexpectedness seems to influence preference, not directly, but
in terms of hedonic tone. However, hedonic tone alone failed to explain the
relationship between unexpectedness and preference ratings. There was a
significant correlation between unexpectedness and preference ratings after the
contribution of unexpectedness through hedonic tone had been partialed out.
Similar findings have also been reported by Moynihan (1980), for instance, who
found evidence that pleasure and preference are indeed different dimensions.
There are a number of ways in which one might attempt to explain these
results in terms of optimal-level theory. It might be argued that other
qualitative differences (apart from valence potential) between the positive and
the negative stories interacted with unexpectedness causing the stories in which
the dog was in the back of Marilyn's car (the story for the positive conditions)
to generate an inverted-U curve quite different from that generated by the
stories in which Marilyn was a drug dealer (the story for the negative
conditions). Optimal-level theory might thus attempt to accommodate the
interaction illustrated in Figure 1 by postulating the two curves shown in
Figure 4. Point E in Figure 4 might correspond to the degree of unexpectedness
for the two expected versions and point U would correspond to the degree of
unexpectedness for the two unexpected versions. In this fashion, it might be
argued, the two identical degrees of unexpectedness could result in
qualitatively opposite hedonic states, not because of any differences in valence
potential but because of other differences between the two stories that would
cause different patterns of interaction between unexpectedness and affect.
Insert Figure 4 About Here
There are, however, problems with this kind of explanation. First, there
is no a priori reason why the positive and negative stories should generate
curves as dramatically different as those illustrated in Figure 4, especially
when the curve corresponding to the negative stories (curve N) has to be
associated with lower degrees of unexpectedness. Secondly, even if the two
stories did result in different curves, one would still have to explain how the
negative stories could be manipulated to obtain the degree of pleasantness
required for the optimal-level in curve N. In general, this line of argument,
while logically possible, is psychologically uninterpretable; we think the
results are more readily explained in terms of qualitative differences in
valence potential rather than in terms of other qualitative differences between
the stories.
Instead of trying to accommodate the results in terms of other qualitative
differences, an optimal-level theorist might argue that the positive and
negative versions differed with respect to other uncontrolled quantitative
factors. For instance, while the negative ending was as unexpected as the
positive ending, it was perhaps more complex. Two types of evidence would
counter such an argument. First, the positive and negative stories did not
differ in content complexity. Complexity ratings of the synopses collected from
ten adult judges revealed that the mean ratings on a 7-point scale (1 = simple,
7 = complex) were 4.6 and 4.2 for the positive and negative versions,
respectively. These values were not significantly different. Secondly, if the
stories were to be different with respect to other collative variables, one
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would expect such differences to be reflected in the affective ratings of the
two expected versions. Since expected stories did not differ in hedonic tone
and preference ratings, it is reasonable to assume that the differences between
the expected and the unexpected stories were only due to the degree of
unexpectedness.
Yet another possibility, although not very plausible, is that
unexpectedness exerted its influence through tension or arousal reduction. It
is possible that the stems for the two unexpected conditions caused more
uncertainty and, therefore, more tension. This tension might have been
temporarily heightened by the unexpectedness of the ending and then reduced when
the surprise was resolved. Optimal-level theorists claim that tension/arousal
reduction can result in positive affect. Zillmann (1980) has argued
convincingly that positive affect cannot be explained merely in terms of relief
from tension. As far as the present results are concerned, even if the
tension-reduction hypothesis were to explain the increment in pleasantness for
the positive unexpected condition, it could not explain the increment in
unpleasantness for the negative story.
It seems then, that the only remaining course of action for the optimal-
level theorist would be to restrict the scope of applicability of the theory to
only "neutral stimuli" (see Russell & Mehrabian, 1978). In this case, valenced
stimuli would constitute a separate source of affective quality. However, in
the past, optimal level theorists have not opted for this solution in the face
of embarrassing data from studies using clearly valenced stimuli such as sugar
or quinine (see, e.g., Walker, 1981). Secondly, the distinction between neutral
and valenced is not always clear-cut. As we argued earlier, valenced stimuli
may seem neutral at lower levels of the quantitative dimension. If one were to
judge the valence of the stimuli used in the present experiment merely on the
basis of pleasantness and preference scores for the two expected conditions, our
stories would seem quite neutral. Finally, and perhaps most seriously, from the
perspective of optimal-level theory such a move would concede too much. It
would be tantamount to abandoning the theory as a general account of the origin
of affect.
Many psychologists, including optimal-level researchers, realize that there
are problems with the inverted-U hypothesis, but they continue to use it
presumably because it has never been definitively refuted, and because there has
been no alternative as broad in scope. The alternatives that there are
(including the attribution of arousal approach) tend to be tied to specific
domains. It is our contention that the present findings constitute an
unequivocal demonstration of the failure of optimal-level theory to explain the
origin of affect. We also believe that the valence potential hypothesis carries
the promise of a genuine alternative. However, although the present findings
are consistent with this hypothesis and were predicted by it, they do not
provide unequivocal support for it. The present experiment tested the valence
potential hypothesis against the inverted-U hypothesis, but not against other
alternatives. Thus, for example, the results might be explicable in terms of
the attribution of arousal theory, although we find this alternative somewhat
less plausible and more restricted in scope than the account we present. An
attribution of arousal account appears to require two assumptions. First, it
must be assumed that unexpectedness exerts its quantitative influence by causing
excitatory reactions that increment autonomic arousal. Second, it must be
assumed that, lacking an explanation for their experienced arousal, subjects
initiate an epistemic search for its cause (cf., Zillmann, 1978). The first
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assumption seems plausible; but there is some evidence (Iran-Nejad, 1983) that
unexpectedness can exert its quantitative influence on the experience of affect
by intensifying intellectual activity in the absence of autonomic arousal. In a
study similar to the present one, cognitive factors such as interestingness did
not correlate at all with perceived autonomic arousal (r = .07, ns.), but
correlated highly with surprisingness (r = .43, p < .001) and, most importantly,
with the intensity of affect (r = .40, p < .001). We are thus reluctant to
assume that subjects' affective ratings in the present experiment resulted from
cognitive evaluation of unexplained arousal increments caused by unexpectedness.
The second assumption seems untenable as far as the present experiment is
concerned. First, even if subjects did experience unexpectedness-induced
arousal, it is difficult to see why, having initiated a search for the cause of
their arousal, they would not opt for the most obvious explanation, namely, "I
am surprised and that is why I am aroused." If they did, they would be likely
to rate the two unexpected endings similarly. But it might be possible to argue
that subjects initiated some sort of a deeper search for clues, in terms of the
critical conclusion information or the story as a whole. It might be argued,
for instance, that subjects reading the negative unexpected ending determined
that what happened to their favorite character was "bad" and used this appraisal
judgment to label their arousal. However, data collected from judges who rated
the synopses indicated that what happened to Marilyn was judged to be moral,
just, legal, and logical. In spite of this, subjects in the main experiment did
not like it. Discrepancies of this sort between cognitive and affective
judgments, though not rare in everyday experience, are difficult to account for
given only the assumption that the quality of affect arises from arousal-
labeling cognitive operations.
Another way of explaining the data would be to argue that the affective
ratings in this experiment were merely the result of story-specific
characteristics. For example, perhaps subjects enjoyed the positive ending
because it contained information that favorably resolved potentially life-
threatening problems facing a liked protagonist. This interpretation, though
conceivable, does not seem to apply to our results. As Table 1 shows, by the
time subjects encounter the critical conclusion information, Marilyn is already
in the safety of a locked office. But even if one were to accept the unlikely
possibility that subjects were still under the influence of the thought, in the
back of their minds, that Marilyn was in danger early in the story, it would
still not be clear why this should be explained in story-specific terms. A
story-independent explanation would be that it is the resolution of life-
threatening problems per se that is positive because, for instance, it activates
in the reader (observer, etc.) ideas related to safety and security that have
positive valence potential. So long as there is nothing in the ending to
interfere with these ideas, it does not matter who the safe and secure
individual happens to be. Thus, even if the story-specific proposal could
explain why the positive ending was rated as positive (as opposed to merely not
negative), the story-independent account would be preferable because of its
generality.
With respect to the unexpected negative condition, a story-specific account
might propose that the unexpected negative ending was disliked because it
contained information that solved the perceived problems facing the liked
protagonist in a manner unfavorable to her. The ending was unpleasant not
because it contained an arrest but because it involved the arrest of a liked
protagonist. The expected negative ending would be rated as neutral because
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subjects in that condition inferred early on that Marilyn was a drug dealer and
thus had little sympathy for her. According to this interpretation, the
expected negative ending, while rated as neutral, must have actually been
positive, not negative, because in it a bad story character, Marilyn, receives
her just deserts. The valence potential hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests
that arrests are threatening and therefore intrinsically negative. Thus, the
neutralness of the expected negative ending was only apparent neutrality (of
something actually negative). As a result, when the ending became unexpected
the initial negativity was intensified and resulted in unpleasantness. Again we
prefer the valence potential hypothesis. First, given the "just deserts"
interpretation, it is not clear why the judges reading the negative synopsis
unanimously rated the critical conclusion information as negative on a
dichotomous scale even though they knew that Marilyn was a drug pusher and that
was why she was arrested. Any theory attempting to explain story affect in
terms of sympathy or empathy with story characters must explain why people can
both dislike bad things and like good things when they happen to bad
individuals. Perhaps some "things" (e.g., murder, rape, injustice) have
negative valence potential regardless of whether the victims are liked or
disliked just as others (e.g., security, love, compassion) are positive
regardless of whether the beneficiaries are good or bad.
In general, story-specific accounts tend to be only descriptive. One still
needs to explain why certain story-specific characteristics (e.g., the degree to
which a reader empathizes with a protagonist) cause differences in affective
valence. Perhaps the valence potential alternative can serve as an initial step
towards such a goal as well as towards explaining those instances of story
affect that cannot be adequately clarified in terms of story-specific
properties. For instance, Iran-Nejad (1983) found evidence suggesting that
subjects' affective ratings were not particularly influenced when critical
conclusion information clearly resolved protagonists' problems. Affective
ratings were much more affected by the degree to which the conclusion provided a
coherent ending to the story, again suggesting that what is important is the
valence potential of the information.
An obvious problem with the present experiment is that it employed only one
set of stimulus materials, leaving open the possibility that the observed
effects, although consistent with the valence potential hypothesis, are actually
artifacts due to a confounding of valence potential and story content. We have
already argued in our discussion of Figure 4 that such an explanation cannot
save the inverted-U hypothesis. However, the fact remains that the positive and
negative stories did differ in content and that this difference corresponded to
the difference in valence. It is, of course, impossible to manipulate valence
without some change in content, a fact that is reflected in such studies as
those reported in Berlyne (19 7 4 c) and Schachter and Singer (1962). Berlyne used
black-and-white reproductions of two pictures having totally different content,
Raeburn's Portrait of a man and Rubens' Massacre of the innocents. Schachter
and Singer used two completely different emotion-inducing enactments, one
designed to induce euphoria and the other designed to induce anger. The tests
of the theories that were provided by these experiments were not considered
inappropriate because of the use of stimuli having different contents. Perhaps
this is because there is no theory of the influence of "raw" content on
affective ratings except when that content is somehow mediated by other factors
(e.g., collative variables in Berlyne's case). In our experiment, the positive
and negative stimuli seem to have been more similar in content than has
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traditionally been the case. Nevertheless, it would be comforting to know that
the findings are replicable with different materials. More recent work that we
have conducted suggests that this is in fact the case. In the course of
investigating a related, but different issue (Iran-Nejad, 1983), data similar to
those in the present experiment were collected. Two basic stories were used in
a somewhat different design using a slightly different procedure. In both cases
the equivalent data revealed the same pattern as those reported here.
The main purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate that optimal-level
theory cannot account for the origin of affect. In general, our claim, based on
our findings and other evidence (see, e.g., Reisenzein, 1983), is that no
explanation of the origin of affect can be based on either arousal itself, or
cognitive labeling of perceived arousal. As an alternative, we proposed the
valence potential hypothesis. This, while ackn6wledging that cognition can
influence affect and that affect can influence cognition, locates the origin of
affect in the influence of determinable valence potential properties of the
stimulus. Valence potential affects affect-specific organismic mechanisms
distinct from those responsible for "cold" cognition. It is thus independent
not only of quantitative stimulus properties--activity potential (i.e., arousal
or intellectual activity)--but also of other qualitative stimulus properties
such as meaning potential in the same way that the auditory properties of a
stimulus are qualitatively distinct from its visual properties. While the data
we have presented disconfirm the optimal-level account of the origin of affect,
and while they cannot be readily accommodated by attribution of arousal
theories, they are compatible with the predictions of the valence potential
hypothesis.
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Table 1
Expectation and Valence Potential Manipulations
as a Function of the Critical Stem and Ending Informationa
Condition Critical Stem Information Critical Ending Information
Negative
A police car is behind Marilyn.
Marilyn is perhaps going to be raped/mugged.
Gabriel is probably a wolf in sheep's clothing.
A police car is behind Marilyn.
Marilyn is perhaps going to be raped/mugged.
Gabriel is probably a wolf in sheep's clothing.
Marilyn
Gabriel
Marilyn
is perhaps a drug dealer.
is probably a police informer.
is perhaps going to be arrested.
Positive
Unexpected
Expected
Marilyn is probably going to be raped/mugged.
A rapist/mugger is in the area and could be in
Marilyn's car.
Gabriel is probably a Good Samaritan.
Marilyn is probably going to be raped/mugged.
A rapist/mugger is in the area and could be in
Marilyn's car.
Gabriel is probably a Good Samaritan.
Hospital attendant has lost his (friendly) dog.
Dog often sleeps in attendant's car.
Attendant's dog may be hiding in Marilyn's car.
Unexpected
Expected
al'he information in this table does not necessarily rep)resent information explicitly stated in the text. Rather
it represents the gist of the most relevant, i.e., critical, information.
Marilyn is not raped/mugged.
Gabriel is not a wolf in sheep's clothing.
Police discover heroin in Marilyn's car.
Marilyn is a drug dealer.
Gabriel is a police informer.
Marilyn, a guilty person, is arrested.
Marilyn is not raped/mugged.
No rapist/mugger is in the car.
Attendant's friendly dog emerges from the car.
Marilyn was never in danger.
Gabriel thought a rapist/mugger was in the car.
Gabriel acted to save Marilyn.
Cabriel is a Good Samaritan.
Marilyn, a good person, is safe and secure.
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Table 2
Mean Expectation and Pleasantness Ratings by Condition
Expectation Pleasantness
Condition Ratings Ratings
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Expected Positive 6.07 3.56 4.93 2.05
Expected Negative 4.33 2.87 5.13 1.55
Unexpected Positive 2.60 1.45 7.60 1.81
Unexpected Negative 1.87 1.25 3.53 1.25
Table 3
Mean Ratings for Direct and Indirect
Postending Preference Scales
Preference Ratings
Condition Direct Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect
Scale Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4
Expected Positive 4.93 7.13 4.33 4.07 4.67
Expected Negative 5.93 5.80 4.67 4.00 6.07
Unexpected Positive 8.07 6.67 3.80 4.00 4.07
Unexpected Negative 5.33 6.93 5.40 4.07 5.07
Total 6.32 6.63 4.55 4.03 4.97
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Mean hedonic tone ratings for positive and negative story
endings as a function of level of expectation.
Figure 2. Mean preference ratings for positive and negative story
endings as a function of level of expectation.
Figure 3. Mean preference ratings for the two unexpected story endings
as a function of time of judgment.
Figure 4. Hypothetical relationship between unexpectedness and hedonic
tone resulting in separate curves for the negative (Curve N) and positive
(curve P) story versions.
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